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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is to analyse section 36 in the light of the Privy 
Council decision in Telecom v Clear. Section 36 will then be compared 
with the doctrine of prime necessity. The comparison notes the different 
elements, purpose and origins of section 36 and the doctrine. The 
paper contains a case study in which the facts of Telecom v Clear are 
applied to the doctrine. The paper concludes with the view that the 
doctrine of prime necessity is a viable alternative to applying section 36 
to natural monopolies. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Privy Council 's treatment of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
(section 36) in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear 
Communications Limited 1 (Telecom v Cleat) has cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of section 36 as a mechanism for promoting competition 
in vertically integrated natural monopolies. In the absence of any 
industry specific regulatory body to control the conduct of natural 
monopolies the Courts have used section 36 as a mechanism to control 
anti-competitive conduct by firms in a dominant position . It is this 
paper's view that the Telecom v Cleaf decision has narrowed the test 
in section 36 to such an extent that it is no longer an effective tool 
capable of ensuring access to distribution networks and facilities that are 
natural monopolies. The failure of section 36 to allow Clear access to 
Telecom 's telecommunications network has effectively prevented 
competition in the local fixed telephone market since negotiations 
commenced between the parties in 1990. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and compare the common law 
prime necessity doctrine with section 36, in order to ascertain whether 
it is a viable mechanism for ensuring access to markets that are natural 
monopolies . With this purpose in mind, the paper is divided into the 
following principal parts: 
(a) Section 36; its elements, 
(b) The doctrine; its origins, purpose and elements, 
(c) Section 36 and Telecom v Clear, 
(d) Alternatives to section 36, 
(e) Section 36 and the doctrine; a comparison, 
1 [1995] 1 NZLR 385 
2Above n 1 
r 
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(f) Section 36 and the doctrine applied to the facts of Telecom v 
Clear. 
The paper will discuss the Privy Council's single test for 'use' and its 
restrictive interpretation of the purpose of section 36 and how this has 
the practical effect of excluding anti-competitive conduct previously 
caught by the section. 
After a survey of the case law concerning the doctrine it will be 
concluded that the doctrine and section 36 are equally capable of being 
applied to a situation where access is being denied to a vertically 
integrated natural monopoly. The principal differences between section 
36 and the doctrine are those of sophistication and the reliance they 
each place on a Court to regulate a fair and reasonable price. Given the 
importance of the regulatory component of the doctrine the paper will 
consider the role and ability of the Court's to set a price for access to 
a natural monopoly. 
The paper concludes with an analysis of the facts of Telecom v Clear 3 
as applied to the doctrine. The analysis will show that the doctrine is 
sufficiently flexible to be a workable alternative to the application of 
section 36 to vertically integrated natural monopolies. 
3Above n, 1 
r 
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II MONOPOLY POWER 
Monopolies occur when 11 [T]he competitive forces which usually prevent 
stagnation, compel efficiency and stimulate progress are not 
operative ... 114 The economic effects of monopoly power have been 
divided into three categories. Allocative inefficiency involves the waste 
of society's resources (and a diminution in society's wealth) by 
monopolies, who, because of the lack of competition, use the resources 
for less valuable purposes.5 Secondly, monopoly pricing transfers 
wealth from the consumer to the monopolist. This transfer is a further 
example of society's wealth being diminished by the actions of a 
monopolist.6 The third category defines a firm's desire to remain 
competitive by developing and improving a product. While a firm strives 
to obtain monopoly profits it competes energetically and in so doing 
reduces its costs and improves the quality of its product. Once 
monopoly profits are reached (or a profit very close to it) the monopoly 
will, now being shielded from competition, adopt the "quiet life" and 
cease to maintain the drive needed to keep costs down and improve the 
product by research.7 
A monopoly may be created by historical accident, exceptional business 
acumen and competitive practices.8 Natural monopolies occur because 
4Sir Arnold Plant, "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices•, Lloyds Bank Review, October 
1948, p7 cited in Alan Ransom & Warren Pengilley. Restrictive Trade Practices: 
Judgments Materials and Policy (Legal Books Pty Ltd , 1985) 24. 
5Robert H Lande, •wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-Trust: 
Toe Efficiency Interpretation Challenged' (1982) 34 Hastings Law Journal 65, 72. 
6Above n 5, 74-77. 
7 Above n 5, 77-79. 
8JGM Shirtcliffe 'Access to Essential Facilities in Electricity Supply' in M Copeland and 
W Haddrell (eds) Competition Review: Current Issues in New Zealand Competition 
and Consumer Law Vol 5 May 1993 (Wellington, Commerce Commission, 1993) 2, 6 . 
• 
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of factors central to or at the heart of the industry involved. They are 
often identified as industries that have "[H]igh sunk costs and/or a high 
degree of technical coordination" .9 The more commonly listed examples 
are electricity networks (the physical means by which the generators of 
electricity convey their electricity to the wholesaler), gas pipelines, 
telecommunications and ports. 
Telecom's local fixed phone network is an example of a vertically-
integrated natural monopoly. Telecom operates the network (a natural 
monopoly) and also competes in a downstream market, being the 
provision of local telephone services. In the electricity industry, the 
electricity distribution line businesses are natural monopolies. These 
businesses can constitute a vertically integrated natural monopoly when 
they compete in the downstream market of electricity retailing. The 
detrimental economic effects of monopoly power will be experienced 
when the monopolist restricts access to the natural monopoly in order 
to restrict or prevent competition in the downstream market. 
Ill SECTION 36 - ITS ELEMENTS 
Section 36 provides: 
9Above n 8, 5. 
36. Use of dominant position in a market - (1) No person who has 
a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the purpose 
of -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other 
market; or 
Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in that or in any other market; or 
Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
r 
8 
Its object is to prevent dominant firms using their market power for anti-
competitive purposes. Ahdar, in the context of the deregulated 
telecommunications industry, has described it as being the "[L]ynchpin 
of light-handed regulation ... 11 • 10 
The paper will now examine the elements of section 36. 
A Market 
It is necessary to define the market in order to assess whether there has 
been a reduction in competition; 11 the market also provides an 
environment in which the concept of dominance can be assessed. 
Section 3(1 A) of the Commerce Act 1986 states that every reference to 
the term market, 11 [l]s a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods 
or services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact 
and commercial common sense, are substitutable for them." A market 
has been defined as having four dimensions, namely: product, 
functional, geographic and time. The product market12 involves 
discovering how many goods are substitutable for those that are in 
issue. The more goods that are substitutable the wider the market is. 
The greater the substitutability, the less likely it is that the behaviour in 
respect of the goods, has substantially reduced competition. The 
functional market is defined horizontally and exists because those 
10R Ahdar, •n,e Privy Council and 'Light-handed' Regulation• (1995) 3. Law Quarterly 
Review, 217,219 
11 See Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR, 352,358 
12 Re The Proposed Takeover by LD Nathan & Co Ltd of McKenzies (NZ) Ltd (1981) 
2 NZAR 321, para 120. See also Yvonne van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand 
Competition Laws (2 ed COH New Zealand Limited, Auckland 1991) 61-65 
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involved in a trade practice may deal in the same goods and 
services.13 The geographic market is that area in which buyers can 
substitute one product for another, an example of a small geographic 
market would be that of the hairdressing trade, in that it is unlikely that 
customers would travel long distances to have their hair cut. 14 The final 
dimension is that of time. The Courts will be concerned with the time 
period in which to assess the amount of product or service substitution. 
It is likely that a Court would be more concerned with promoting the 
objective of the Commerce Act 1986 (the promotion of competition) in 
long run (permanent) markets rather than those of a short run 
(transitory) nature. As McGechan J said, "[M]arkets are objective facts. 
The exist, lik~ the weather. They are not abstract concepts to be 
tailored, as to boundaries, so as to facilitate some desired ultimate 
outcome" .15 
B Dominant Position 
Until the Court of Appeal decision in Telecom Corporation NZ Limited 
v Commerce Commission16 the Commerce Commission and the High 
Court had adopted an economic definition of the word "dominant". 
Relying on the Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome 17 origin of the words 
13See van Roy above n 12, 62 and Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Commerce 
Commission & Others (1991) 3 NZBLC, 99-239 
14See van Roy above n 12, 63 and Re The New Zealand Council of Registered 
Hairdressers (Inc) [1961] NZLR 161 
15The Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Limited (1995) 5 NZBLC 102 340, 102, 
358 
16(1992] 3 NZLR 429 
17 Article 86 states: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the commission market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited 
as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade 
between member states r 
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11dominant purpose 11 , the Commission in News Limited/ Independent 
Newspapers Limited, adopted an economic approach when it said a 
business was dominant when it was, 11 [A]ble to make significant business 
decisions, particularly those relating to price and supply, without regard 
to the competitors, suppliers, or customers of that person 11 • 18 
In Re Broadcast Communications Limitedthe Commission redefined the 
meaning of dominance when it stated it19 : 
[E]xists when a person is in a position of economic strength such that 
it can behave to a large extent independently of that person 's 
competitors. A person in a dominant position will be able to effect an 
appreciable change in the price and or other aspects of supply of his 
goods and services and maintain this change for an appreciable 
length of time without suffering serious adverse impact on profitability . 
The Commission used the Broadcast Communications LimitecPO test in 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited/The Crowrf1• The 
decision proceeded to the Court of Appeal22 where the economic 
approach to dominance was rejected. All five judges adopted a non-
technical, dictionary based meaning of the word dominant. Richardson 
J delivered the leading judgment. He criticised23 the Broadcast 
Communications Limited decision which said 11 large 11 and 11appreciable 11 
18 (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 99-500; 104, 054. An economic analysis of Article 86 is 
contained in Re Continental Can Co Inc (1972) CMLR 011 
19(1990) 2 NZBLC (Com) 99-526 
20Above n 19 
21 Decision 254, 17 October 1990. This decision involved Telecom seeking clearance 
from the Commerce Commission (under section 66(3) of the Commerce Act 1986) for 
the purchase of a cellular frequency called AMPS-A 
22Te/ecom Corporation NZ Limited v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429 
23Above n 22, 442 • 
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were synonymous with "dominant". He stated :24 
Clearly the dominance test sets a rigorous threshold. It is not 
sufficient that the influence be advantageous or powerful. It must be 
dominant. The word comes from the Latin dominus meaning master. 
Only one person can be dominant in a particular aspect of a market 
at any one time. Not surprisingly standard dictionaries give meanings 
such as 'ruling•, •governing" , •commanding•, •reigning• , •ascendant•, 
"prevailing• and •paramount•. 
In Commerce Commission v Port Nelson LimitecP (Port Nelson 1995) 
the Court, it appears reluctantly,26 followed the Court of Appeal 's 
dictionary (non-economic) definition of dominant. McGechan J's 
discussion of the definition noted the following points:27 
(a) Although the definition of dominance was not a matter of 
economic theory it could not be separated from the competitive 
nature of the Commerce Act 1986 on which economic concepts 
would inevitably have an input. 
(b) Dominance does not mean absolute control, there need not be 
24Above n 22, 442. For a critical appraisal of the Court of Appeal 's decision see, Ross 
H Patterson 'The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealand 's Competition 
Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation• (1993) 15 NZULR 265. Patterson 
argues that the application of the dictionary meaning to "dominant• , ' [T]o a greater or 
lesser extent turned the established jurisprudence on its head.' (see p280). The 
consequence of which is to place, • [T]he market power threshold far higher than had 
been intended by the framers of the legislation•. (see p267). For a less pessimistic 
v:,ew see J A Farmer, "Deregulation and Competition: is the Commerce Act working?• 
[1993] NZ Recent Law Review, 14 
25Above n 15 
26McGechan J was a member of the Court of Appeal, that confirmed the economic 
approach to dominance, in ECNZ v Geotherm Energy Limited (1992) 2 NZLR 641 . 
At page 49 of Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Limited (Above n 15, 103788) 
McGechan J said, "(I] have no choice .. ." but to follow the Court of Appeal decision. • If 
that standard is too divorced from the requirements of modern competition law, 
legislative action may be warranted". 
27 Above n 15, 103 787-103 ~88 
12 
a monopoly 
(c) The dominant firm must be able to operate commercially without 
significant competitive restraints, and 
(d) While operating must be able to dictate an increase in prices 
without fear of competitive restraint, or reduce prices knowing 
that its competitors would have to follow 
(e) The ability to dictate must be sustainable and that the concept of 
dominance sets a very high standard. 
Consistent with his reluctance to follow the Court of Appeal, McGechan 
J appears to have read down the dictionary definition. His view that the 
definition could not be separated from an essentially 
economic/competition orientated statute, that absolute control was not 
necessary and that the control must be sustainable are all indicative of 
a lower threshold test than that envisaged in the Court of Appeal. 
Once having defined the meaning of dominance it is necessary to look 
for its existence. Section 3(8) of the Commerce Act 1986 directs the 
Court to look for a firm in a position to exercise a dominant influence not 
the actual exercise of a dominance influence . Section 3(8)(a), (b) and 
(c) set out non-exhaustive factors28 that may indicate dominance. 
Structural factors such as market share, access to capital and materials, 
technical knowledge and barriers to entry are noted in section 3(8)(a) . 
Sections 3(8)(b) and (c) ask the Court to have regard to the extent to 
which the person is constrained by the conduct of competitors or 
potential competitors, and suppliers or acquirers of the goods or 
services . The Court of Appeal in Telecom Corporation NZ Limited v 
Commerce Commissiorf?-9 did not share the High Court 's view° that 
281n News Limited/Independent Newspapers Limited above n 18, the Commission set 
out an expanded list of factors that could be used in determining dominance 
29Above n 16 
r 
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in determining the existence of dominance market structure was the 
primary determinant of market power or dominance. This approach 
emphasised the section 3(8)(a) factor over the market conduct 
(behavioural) factors in sections 3(8)(b) and (c). Richardson J in 
stressing the case by case nature of the enquiry said:31 
Section 3(8) does not allow any theoretical or intuitive ranking 
applicable in all cases. It proceeds on the premise that the weighting 
must vary according to the particular facts . It calls for a pragmatic 
assessment in the particular circumstances of one's ability to exercise 
a dominant influence in one or more aspects of the relevant market. 
C Use (of a Dominant Position) 
It will be recalled that section 36(1) relates to persons who use their 
dominance in the market for anti-competitive purposes. Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltcl32 
considered the meaning of 11take advantage of'33 which is the Australian 
30See Telecom Corporation New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 3 
NZBLC 102, 340, 102 367 
31 Above n 22, 444 
32(1989) ATPR 40, 925. The case involved a large steel manufacturer 's (BHP) refusal 
to supply a steel Y-bar to Queensland Wire. Queensland Wire wanted to produce 
fence posts (of which the Y-bar was a component) in competition to BHP's wholly 
owned subsidiary. 
33Section 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act states: 
46(1) A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall 
not take advantage of that power for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the 
corporation or of a body corporate that is related to the 
corporation in that or any other market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a power on in to that or any other 
market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive 
con9uct in that or any other market 
14 
equivalent of "use" in section 36. The High Court of Australia held that 
the words were to be equated with the neutral word "use" .34 Van 
Roy35 notes that the test for use in Queensland Wire has been 
summarised in the following ways:36 
(a) Is the conduct made possible only by the absence of competitive 
conditions? 
(b) Is the conduct something that only a firm with substantial market 
power [dominant firm] can do? 
(c) Could the conduct be done if the market was vigorously 
competitive? 
In Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v Bora/ Gerrard Strapping Systems Pty 
Ltd37 the Court stated that the role of "use" was to provide a causal 
connection between the acts complained of and the degree of power in 
the market. Use was not to be viewed in isolation but in conjunction with 
the prohibited purposes set out in sections 46(1 )(a), (b) and (c), 
(sections 36(1 )(a), (b) and (c) of the Commerce Act 1986). Wilson J (in 
Queensland Wire) said "It is these purpose provisions which define what 
uses of market power constitute misuses"38 . In a case that was 
decided before any New Zealand decisions39 that considered 'use ' as 
34Above n 32, 50, 012 
35yvonne van Roy 'The Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear. Narrowing the 
application of s36 of the Commerce Act 1986" [1995] NZLJ 54 
36Above n 35, 57 
37(1992)ATPR 41 - 196, p40, 644 
38Above n 32, 50,010 
39See Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd below n 43, ECNZ v 
Geotherm Energy Ltd above n 26 and Telecom Corporation New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd above fl 1 
15 
a separate element, Tipping J, in New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v 
Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd,40 (Magic Millions) emphasised the 
importance of the prohibited purposes in subsections 36(1 )(a), (b) and 
(c). In contrast to the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Cleat41 
Tipping J considered that proof of one of anti-competitive purposes 
almost certainly meant that there had been a use of a dominant firm's 
position in the market; he said42 , 
It seems to me that the key question is not so much whether a 
dominant party has used its dominant position but rather whether or 
not its conduct is proved to have been for one or more of the 
proscribed purposes ... 
In Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltcf3 the Court 
emphasised "use" over purpose. McGechan J stated, "If a person 
simply acts in a normal competitive fashion , as he would whether 
dominant or not, that person can hardly be said to be "using 
dominance".44 
The different approaches to the significance of "use" in Magic Millions45 
and Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltcf6 was resolved 
40 [1990] 1 NZLR, 731 
41 [1995] 1 NZLR, 385,402 Where the Privy Council said it was "[D]angerous to argue .. . 
that because the anti-competitive purpose was present, there was use of a dominant 
position .• 
42Above n 39, 761 
43[1990] 2 NZLR 662 
44Above n 43, 706 
45Above n 40 
46Above n 43 
• 
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by the Court of Appeal in ECNZ v Geotherm Energy Ltcf7. Gault J 
confirmed that use and purpose were separate concepts, that required 
proof in order to show contravention of section 36. He stated:48 
The conduct prohibited by the section is the use of the dominant 
market position for the proscribed purposes. There will be 
circumstances in which the use of the market position and the 
purpose are not easily separated but the two requirements must be 
kept in mind. 
In the High Court determination of Telecom Corporation New Zealand 
Ltd v Clear Communications Ltcf9 the word "use" was given little 
judicial time. The Court concentrated its analysis of Telecom's activities 
on the requirement to prove purpose. It held that Telecom's pricing 
model for interconnection to its network was likely to improve 
competition and because of this, it was not possible to imply an anti-
competitive purpose on the part of Telecom. 
The Court of Appeal50 considered that the "use" and "purpose" 
elements had been proved and that Telecom 's reliance on its pricing 
model constituted a breach of section 36. After noting the dangers of 
substituting synonyms for the statutory words, Gault J said that in 
questioning whether or not a natural monopolist ( or a firm that controls 
an essential facility) has used its position in the market, a Court could 
47Above n 26 
48Above n 43, 646-647 
4S1992 5 (TCLR) 166 The Court considered that the BaumoVWillig rule was more likely 
than the alternatives to foster competition and because of this, use of the rule could 
not amount to Telecom using its dominance to deter Clear from competing. This 
analysis of use appears to concentrate on the effect of the conduct , rather than the 
conduct itself. It is difficult to see how the Court effectively separated 'use ' from 
'purpose ', because it also used the effect of the rule to establish purpose (see p217). 
50(1993) 4 NZBLC 103, 340 • 
17 
enquire as to "[W]hether the firm has acted reasonably or with 
justification ."51 In the circumstances of a natural monopoly he 
considered that a separate enquiry into Telecom's purpose was 
unnecessary, as it could, "[B]e inferred from the inevitability of the 
consequences of refusing to deal except on terms that lead to a 
competitive advantage."52 The Court considered that Telecom's use of 
the pricing rule (which preserved Telecom's monopoly profits) was 
unjustified and something that only a monopolist could do. Accordingly, 
reliance on the rule amounted to use of a dominant position. 
It has been recognised that the Queensland Wire53 and Union Shipping 
New Zealand Limitedv Port Nelson Limited 54 tests are best "[U]sed as 
guides rather than absolute benchmarks."SSVan Roy noted that the 
Queensland Wire36 test of, "is the conduct made possible because of 
the market dominance"? difficult to apply because it does not take into 
account the fact that the same conduct (for example, price cutting) 
might be engaged in by dominant and non-dominant firms alike. A 
dominant firm may cut its prices below marginal cost in an attempt to 
destroy a competitor while a non-dominant firm might do the same to 
secure a foothold in a market. In the example given, the type of conduct 
is the same but the effect in the former example is anti-competitive and 
in the latter, pro-competitive.57 Van Roy noted that the Union Shipping 
51 Above n 50,103,354 
52Above n 50, 103,360 
53Above n 30 
54Above n 43 
55See van Roy above n 12, 152 
56Above 30 
57See van Roy above n 12, 152 
• 
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New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson LtcP, "is the firm acting in a normal 
competitive fashion, as it would whether dominant or not..."?, test would 
involve the Court embarking on an analysis of normal competitive 
behaviour in any particular industry .59 Such a criticism was echoed by 
the Court of Appeal in Telecom Corporation NZ Ltd v Clear 
Communications LtcF when Telecom argued that its pricing model did 
not constitute a breach of section 36 because it only reflected what a 
non-dominant firm in a competitive market would do. Gault J noted that 
this argument attracted, "[T]he construction of theoretical economic 
models ... "61 on which economists were unlikely to agree. In conclusion 
van Roy suggests62 that the difficulty of formulating one test for use is 
such that the search for use should be carried out in conjunction with 
that for the section 36(1 ){a), (b) and (c) search for purpose. 
D Purpose 
Under section (2) (5) (b) of the Commerce Act 1986 a person will be 
deemed to have been engaged in conduct for a particular purpose if 
that purpose was the substantial63 purpose. A dominant firm will 
contravene section 36 when it has used its market power for the 
purpose of achieving one of the results listed in section 36(1 )(a), (b) and 
(c). It is not necessary to actually achieve the result. As Hampton 
58Above n 43 
59See van Roy above n 12, 152 
00Above n 50 
61 Above n 50, 103, 354 
62See van Roy above n 12, 153 
63.Substantiar is defined in s2(1A) of the Commerce Act 1986 as being 'real or of 
substance• 
r 
states:64 
19 
[T]he fact that certain acts or practices engaged in by dominant firms 
achieve or attain the consequences set forth in s36{1 ){a)-{c) is not of 
itself sufficient to make the section applicable to those acts or 
practices. Before liability can arise, a plaintiff must prove that the 
impugned acts or practices constitute the use of a dominant position 
for one or more of the proscribed purposes. 
In Port Nelson 199S5'5 McGechan J noted that, "There is rampant 
uncertainty within New Zealand Courts whether "purpose" in s27 and 
s36 is to be ascertained objectively or subjectively, or under both 
heads" .00 The Court went on to survey67 Australasian authority on the 
topic. The Court concluded that there was no authoritative decision 
favouring one approach over the other, and adopted both a subjective 
and objective test to the existence of purpose. Such a solution was 
arrived at with reference to the likelihood that the Plaintiff in proof of its 
64J Farrar & Borrowdale {eds) Butterworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 756-757 
65Above n 15 
00Above n 15, 103, 773 
67 Above n 15, 103 773 - 103 776. Auck land Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars 
(Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, (ARA), favoured an objective test, Magic 
Millions (above n 40) a subjective test, Union Shipping New Zealand Limited v Port 
Nelson Limited {above n 43, 709) favoured an objective test, but left the issue open. 
McGechan J considered that Tui Foods v NZ Milk Corporation {{1993) 4 NZBLC 103, 
335, 103,338) (a case that dealt with section 29 of the Commerce Act 1986) suggested 
that an objective approach would be sufficient, but where evidence is lacking, a 
subjective approach may suffice, and Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v 
Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR, 385 as favouring a mixed 
objective/subjective approach. McGechan J's survey missed the High Court decision 
in Apple Fields Ltd v New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (1989) 2 NZLBC 
103, 564 which favoured a subjective test. The Court of Appeal later overturned the 
High Court decision but not spec~ically on the correct test (see [1989] 3 NZLR 158) 
but on the issue of section 43 of the Commerce Act 1986, statutory authorisation. A 
decision which was later overturned by the Privy Council (see [1991] 1 NZLR 257). 
The Court noted the differing Australian approaches on the same issue and was unable 
to discern one particular ap~roach in the ascendancy. 
20 
claim was just as likely to adduce evidence that tended to prove 
purpose subjectively as well as objectively. McGechan J stated :68 
[A] plaintiff may establish anti competitive purpose objectively , in the 
sense of inviting the inference from actions and circumstances. That 
will be the more ordinary approach. Alternatively, a plaintiff may 
establish anti competitive purpose subjectively , in the sense of 
evidence otherwise of actual thinking .. . Where a plaintiff has both 
objective and subjective evidence, a plaintiff may - and doubtless will -
present both. Any other approach is artificial. It will not ordinarily 
impose an unfair additional burden on the plaintiff to lead evidence of 
subjective intention (if held) as well as objective, and to cross examine 
in the area , if subjective intention is raised by the defendant. 
Having looked at the basic components of section 36, it is important to 
note that section 36 has been used in a variety of circumstances. In 
Magic Millions'39 it was used to prevent the anti competitive scheduling 
of horse auctions. In the ARA70 case the section was used to enable 
rival car rental firms to have their applications for a rental car concession 
considered, in Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Limitecf1 
and Port Nelson 1995 Limited'2 it was used to stop Port Nelson Limited 
refusing to deal with stevedores and maritime pilots on terms that were 
designed to prevent competition . 
The discussion of section 36 has set out the complexity and ongoing 
development of the meaning of the elements of, the comparatively new, 
section 36. In contrast, the prime necessity doctrine will now be considered. 
68Above n 15, 103, 777 
69Above n 40 
70Above n 67 
71Above n 43 
72Above n 15 
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IV THE PRIME NECESSITY DOCTRINE 
A Origins 
The doctrine has its origin in a late seventeenth century private essay of 
the Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench, Lord Hale. In De Portibus 
Maris73 Lord Hale stated: 74 
If the king or subject have a publick wharf, unto which all persons that 
come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for 
the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the queen, 
or because there is no other wharf in that port, ... in that case there 
cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, 
... but the duties must be reasonable and moderate .. . For now the 
wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a publick 
interest, and they cease to be juris privati only ; ... it is now no longer 
bare private interest, but it is affected with a publick interest. 
Lord Hale postulated that there were three major divisions of the law: 
the rights and powers of the King, the rights of the person and the rights 
of things. The latter category was divided into juris publici75 and juris 
privati76 . Lord Hale considered that things that were juris privati could 
become juris publici if the activity took on, as a consequence of external 
73Reproduced in F Hargrave, Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England 
(1787), Val 2 Part 2, Chapter 3, 77, cited in B P McAllister "Lord Hale and Business 
Affected with a Public Interest• (1929 -1930) 43 Harv L. Rev 759. 
74See Hargrave above n 73, 77 
75See B P McAllister, above n 73, 761 . Things that are juris publici are those common 
to the public , examples are common bridges, rivers and ports 
76See B P McAllister, above n 73, 761 . Things that are juris privati are those that arise 
by contract an example, in the case of a 17th century port, would be the franchise the 
Monarch has granted to an jndividual to run and charge for port services 
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factors,77 a public function. It was in this context that Lord Hale, in De 
Portibus Maris,76 considered that the private rights of an individual to 
operate a wharf were subject to the rights of persons to use that wharf 
(once it had become subject to the public interest), for a reasonable fee. 
Lord Hale defines juris publici in terms of the regulation of trade and 
commerce and more particularly the control of prices. He specifically 
noted that the rights and powers of the King included the power to 
regulate commerce, weights, coinage and prices79 . Although, at a 
practical level, it could be argued that the effect of Lord Hale 's doctrine 
is to regulate commerce it is equally true that the delineation of the rights 
of things has just as much to do with a description of the competing 
demands on, and conflicting rights over, property. Lord Hale chose the 
interests of the public as the rights that should prevail80 . 
Thirteen years after the first publication of De Portibus Maris, Bold v 
Stenne~1 became the first English case to apply Lord Hale 's doctrine. 
It was held that the owner of a licensed wharf must allow the public to 
use the crane positioned on the wharf on reasonable terms . 
77 An Act of Parliament, allowing private property to be used for a specific purpose (eg 
customs collection). Lord Hale gave the example of an operator of a ferry being 
required to charge a reasonable fee when the ferry became the only means of crossing 
a river because of the destruction of a nearby bridge, see B P McAllister, above n 73 
762 
78Above n 73 
79See B P McAllister above n 73, 761 
80See also PP Craig Administrative Law (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1989) 155-
159, who believes that the doctrine is related to the ' Common Calling• cases that 
evolved at times of sociaVeconomic hardship. He cttes the period after the Black 
Death when surviving tradespeople were obliged to provide their services at 
reasonable rates , so as to prevent charging whatever they pleased. Craig is ctted in 
J Land 'The Prime Necesstties Doctrine: Where Does It Ftt?' a paper prepared for the 
sixth workshop of the Competttion Law and Policy lnstttute of New Zealand, Wellington 
4 - 6 August 1995 
81 (1800) 8 T.R. 606 .. 
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Ten years later Ellenborough C J, in Allnutt and Another v lngli~ 
(Allnutt), cited Lord Hale's doctrine. The defendant was the treasurer of 
a company that operated the London Dock warehouses . The company 
was subsequently certified by the General Warehousing Act 83 , as 
being a warehouse where importers could secure their "[4]0 pipes of 
wine ... "84 for the period before they were obliged to pay duty. 
The plaintiff sought a declaration that the company could only impose 
a rental that was reasonable as to price and its terms. Lord 
Ellenborough held that the company owned the only premises in which 
importers could secure their goods in terms of the General Warehousing 
Act and as such enjoyed a monopoly of a public privilege . Because of 
the monopoly the company was obliged to charge a reasonable rental. 
Judicial acceptance of Lord Hale 's doctrine had an inauspicious start in 
New Zealand. In Wellington Gas Company v Patterf35 the company 
appealed the decision of the Magistrates Court that held that the 
company could not refuse to supply gas to Patten until such time as he 
had paid the arrears owed by a former tenant of the hotel he was now 
resident in. The Court upheld the obligation of the company "[T]o 
supply the inhabitants of Wellington with gas so long as they paid 
reasonable prices for it.1186 
After considering Allnutf'7 Williams J, in the Court of Appeal, stated 
82(1810) 12 East 527 and 104 ER 206, 211 . 
8343 G.3, c .132. 
84104 ER 206, 209. 
85(1885) 2 NZLR 205 (the date of decision was 8 December 1881) 
86 Above n 85, 205 
87Above n 82 • 
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that it was incumbent on the individual seeking to use the services of a 
monopoly to prove the existence of a right to use them. On perusal of 
the empowering legislation (The Wellington Gas Company Act 1870) the 
majority found the company was under no obligation to supply everyone 
with gas at a reasonable rate and that the company was at liberty to 
enter such contracts as they please. The legislation was so general it 
did not afford Patten the right to demand gas from the company. 
Accordingly the company was within its rights to refuse to deal with 
Patten on the terms it did and that Allnutf8 was of no application. This 
perverse decision has not been followed (or cited) in any subsequent 
New Zealand decisions. 
B Purpose 
In Minister of Justice for the Dominion of Canada v City of Levisi39 
(Levis) the Privy Council considered the Levis Council's obligation to 
supply water to a building owned by the Canadian Government. A 
dispute had arisen between the Council and the Government about the 
cost that the Council could charge for the supply of water to the 
Government's building. When negotiations broke down the Council cut 
off the Government buildings water supply. It was held that although the 
Government was not liable to pay the taxes levied on the property for 
payment of the construction of the waterworks and the water itself, there 
was an obligation on the Government to pay a fair and reasonable 
88Above n 82 
89[1919] AC 505. See also Chastain v British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority 
(1972) 32 DLR (3d) 443, which concerned the supply electricity. The Court affirmed 
the prime necessity doctrine with the following (seep 454) comment: 
The obligation of a public utility or other body having a practical 
monopoly on the supply of a particular commodity or service of 
fundamental importance to the public has long been clear. It is to 
supply its product to all who seek it for a reasonable price and without 
unreasonable discrimination between those who are similarly situated 
or who fall into one class of consumers . 
• 
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payment to the Council for the supply of water. While acknowledging 
that the Council did not have a monopoly9(i, Parmoor LJ said :91 
[l]t must be recognised, however, that water is a matter of prime 
necessity, and that, where waterworks have been established to give 
a supply of water within a given area for domestic and sanitary 
purposes, it would be highly inconvenient to exclude from the 
advantages of such supply Government buildings, on the ground that 
these buildings are not liable to water taxation. The respondents are 
dealers in water on whom there has been conferred by statute a 
position of great and special advantage, ... Their Lordships are 
therefore of opinion that there is an implied obligation on the 
respondents to give a water supply to the Government building 
provided that, and so long as, the Government of Canada is willing , in 
consideration of the supply, to make a fair and reasonable payment. 
In contrast to section 36, the doctrine has been used for many 
purposes, in most cases the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour 
has not been an issue that needed to be addressed. In Levi~ no 
mention was made of the promotion of commerce or trade. The Court 
held that the special position the City of Levis found itself in conferred 
on it, a public interest or social obligation to supply water. The City of 
Levis, being a supplier of water, held, "[A] position of great and special 
advantage ... "93 that prevented it from cutting off supply if it obtained a 
fair and reasonable payment. In the search for a means of defining the 
relationship between the Government (that was not liable to pay for the 
water, it being charged as a tax) and the City of Levis (that had cut off 
90Above n 89, 512. 
91Above n 89,513. 
92Above n 89 
93Above n 89,513 
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the supply of water) the Court imposed an obligation to supply when the 
supplier did not have a monopoly .94 A wider definition of "prime 
necessity" was introduced and in so doing the social or public duties 
were extended to those who were not monopolies. 
In Mayor, etc, of Auckland v The King95 (Mayor of Auckland) the Levis 
principles were applied to a dispute about the payment of rubbish 
collection charges. The Court agreed that the Post Office department 
wasn't liable to pay the charges as they were levied pursuant to an Act 
that did not bind the Crown. After holding that the collection of rubbish 
was a prime necessity Stringer J went on to say that to hold the Crown 
not liable to pay a fair and reasonable fee would mean that a greater fee 
would have to be levied on the taxpayers to make good the shortfall. 
The usefulness of the prime necessity doctrine is apparent in the State 
Advances Superintendent v Auckland City Corporation and The One 
Tree Hill Borougtf6decision (State Advances). The local city 
Corporation and Borough had failed to agree over the terms of the 
supply of water to the Crown(acting through its powers contained in the 
State Advances Act 1913). State Advances was not about competition, 
commerce or trade, it was principally an exercise in the statutory 
construction of section 86 of the Municipal Corporations Act 192097 
which set out the power of the Corporation and the Borough to withhold 
the supply of water where there was non-payment by the person liable. 
94Above n 89, 512 
95 [1924] GLR 415 
96 (1932] NZLR 1709 
97Section 86 states: 
If any person refuses or fails to pay any water rate for which he is liable, the Council may, without 
prejudice to any other remedy for the recovery of such rate , stop, in such manner as the Council 
thinks fit , the supply of water to the premises in respect of which such rate is payable, and may 
recover from such person the whole expense incurred in stopping such supply . • 
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Levis was cited as a statement of general principle that stood outside 
the statutory framework and was consequently available as an aid to the 
construction of the section .98 The Court held that the Corporation and 
Borough only had the power to cease supplying a person who is liable 
and in actual possession of the property. In the present case, State 
Advances had rented the premises (using its mortgagee power; it was 
not in physical possession) and accordingly the tenants' premises had 
to be supplied with water in return for a fair and reasonable fee. 
The Wairoa Electric Power Board v Wairoa Borouglf9 ( Wairoa) and 
South Taranaki Electric Power Board v Patea Borough100 (South 
Taranakt) decisions involved disputes between monopoly suppliers of 
electricity and the local boroughs. In both cases the existing commercial 
relationships had broken down and the issue of price for the continued 
supply remained at large. In both cases the prime necessity doctrine 
was held to apply and imposed as a means of resolving a dispute 
between a purchaser and a seller. 
The Hutt Golf Course Estate Company Limited v Hutt City 
Corporation101 (Hutt Golf Course) decision is perhaps the most 
obvious example of the utilitarian nature of the prime necessity doctrine. 
The Hutt Golf Course Estate Company sued the Hutt City Corporation 
for €720.00 being the cost of sewage and water connections installed on 
the Corporation's instructions. The Corporation had not paid because 
the Crown (the purchaser of the allotments in which the connections 
were installed) was not liable to pay for building permits. It was a term 
98Above n 96, 1715 (Myers CJ), 1723 (Herdman J) and 1725 (Kennedy J) 
99[1937] NZLR 211 
100(1955] NZLR 954 
101 (1945] NZLR 56 
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of the agreement between the Hutt Golf Course Estate Company and 
the Hutt City Corporation, that the Corporation would not pay the 
company until the building permit had been paid.102 At first instance 
and on appeal it was argued that the prime necessity doctrine went as 
far as obliging the Crown to pay fair and reasonable water and sewage 
connection (in addition to supply) fees,. After Blair J's acceptance of 
this proposition, the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected this 
argument and held that such an extension of the prime necessity 
doctrine was not contemplated by the Levis.103 decision. What is 
more significant than the ultimate rejection of the broadening of the 
prime necessity doctrine is the fact that both the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal did not question the proposition that the doctrine could 
be imposed on a non-party (the Crown) to the proceeding as a means 
of resolving a land development/construction dispute between the Hutt 
City Corporation and the Hutt Golf Course Estate Company. The prime 
necessity doctrine was not being considered in the context of a dispute 
between purchaser and seller, but in a situation where one party to a 
dispute was seeking to enforce payment of a debt. The application of 
the doctrine to the facts is a long way from Lord Hale 's analysis of a 
person's private interest in property being subject to the public's interest. 
There was no suggestion that the prime necessity doctrine was being 
used for a social or public purpose, nor was it envisaged that the Crown 
was going to be deprived of a water supply to its allotments. 
After the South Taranakt1 04 case the doctrine appears to have fallen 
into disuse until its re-emergence in Auckland Electric Power Board v 
102Above n 101, 73 
103Above n 89 
104Above n 100 
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Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited (Auckland Electric)1 05 • 
In facts not dissimilar to those in Wairoa106 Barker J, in an 
interlocutory decision, confirmed the existence of the proposition, "[T]hat 
a monopoly supplier of an essential commodity has a duty to supply 
and charge a fair and reasonable price with a corresponding duty on the 
recipient to pay a reasonable price .11 107 On appea1108 the Court of 
Appeal upheld Barker J's interlocutory decision . Richardson J109 cited 
the Allnut110 ' State Advances
111
, Wairoa11 2 and South 
Taranak,113 decisions and confirmed the prime necessity doctrine. 
In New Zealand Rail Limited v Port Marlborough New Zealand 
Limitecf 14 the Court of Appeal dealt with an interlocutory appeal 
concerning the discovery of documents and their relevance to the 
105(1993] 3 NZLR 53 
106Above n 99. IN 1988 ECNZ entered a transttion agreement wtth the Board under 
which ECNZ would supply electricity while negotiations for a new agreement were 
continuing . No new agreement had been resolved by March 1993. In the same month 
ECNZ purported to terminate the transttional agreement . The Board then commenced 
proceedings seeking a declaration that the transttional agreement was still in force . In 
Mercury Energy Limited (the renamed Auckland Electric Power Board) v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited Unreported, 22 May 1995, High Court , Auckland 
Registry, CP 20/92, Temm J granted a declaration to Mercury Energy Limited that the 
transttional agreement remained in force. The declaration was granted wtthout 
reference to the doctrine of prime necessity and on the basis that ECNZ had breached 
the earlier transttional agreement wtth Mercury. 
107 Above n 105, 60. The cause of action asserting the proposttion way struck out 
because on the facts and given the other causes of action, tt was superfluous 
108(1994] 1 NZLR 551 
109Above n 108, 557 
110Above n 85 
111Above n 96 
112Above n 99 
113Above n 100 
114 (1993] 2 NZLR, 641 
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calculation of a reasonable fee . Such a question had arisen in the 
context of New Zealand Rail Limited's causes of action, one of which 
relied on the prime necessity doctrine. 
The most recent decision to affirm the existence of the doctrine is that 
of the High Court in Airways Corporation of NZ Limited v Geyser/and 
Airways Limited.115 The dispute concerned whether or not Geyserland 
had to pay a fee ($7 .00 per takeoff) for air traffic control services at 
Rotorua airport. The High Court upheld the District Court decision that 
there was no contract between the Corporation and Geyserland 
stipulating payment of the fee. The High Court noted the Corporation 's 
concession that it had a practical monopoly in the provision of air traffic 
control services and a duly to provide them for a reasonable fee . 
It is clear from the survey of the cases that the doctrine remains alive 
and that it has not been rendered redundant by the passing of 
increasingly more sophisticated competition legislation. In contrast to 
the specific purpose of section 36 the doctrine has been used in a 
variety of circumstances and for a variety of purposes. The paper will 
now discuss the elements of the doctrine. 
C The Elements 
The prime necessity doctrine, as enunciated in Levis,11 6 has three 
components: a prime necessity, (a supplier in) a position of great and 
special advantage and a fair and reasonable payment. 
1 Prime necessity 
115Unreported , 30 June 1995, High Court, Rotorua Registry , AP 127 and 128/94. 
11 6Above n 89 
r 
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The Bolt v Stennett117 and Allnutt 118 decisions adhered to Lord 
Hale's formulation of a person's private rights in property being subject 
to the public interest to use that property in return for payment of a fair 
and reasonable fee. In Levis119 the prime necessity was the supply of 
water. The supply of rubbish collection services120 and electricity121 
have been confirmed as a prime necessity. More recently the prime 
necessity doctrine has been asserted as applying to a right of access 
to port facilities 122 • The activities, defined as prime necessities, are by 
their nature, enterprises that lend themselves to industries that are 
monopolistic. 
2 A position of great and special advantage - (The concept of 
monopoly) 
The supplier of the prime necessity must be in the position of a 
monopoly. Lord Hale did not use the word monopoly, but he referred 
to an analogous circumstance when he described the public 's need to 
use a wharf when it was, "[O]nly licenced by the Queen .. . ", 123 or 
117 Above n 81 
118Above n 84 
119Above n 89 
120See Mayor of Auckland above n 95 
121 Seethe Wairoa, South TaranakiandAuckland Electric cases, above n 99, n 100 and 
n 105. See also New Zealand Pdvate Hospitals Association - Auckland Branch (Inc) 
et al v Northern Regional Health Authority Unreported (Interlocutory decision) 7 
December 1994, High Court , Auckland Registry , CP 440/94, where (at page 30) 
Blanchard J noted (without enthusiasm) the submission that the prime necessity 
doctrine could place a monopoly purchaser (a source of money) under a duty to 
contract and pay a fair and reasonable sum for goods and services 
122See New Zealand Rail Limited v Port Marlborough New Zealand Ltd above n 114, 
642 
123See text at above n 74 
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because there was, "[N]o other wharf in that port ... ".124 In Levis125 
the Court, taking a narrow view of monopoly, concluded that no 
monopoly existed as there was nothing to "[P]revent any owner or 
occupier from providing an independent supply ... "126 In the absence 
of a monopoly the Court defined the nature of the commodity (a prime 
necessity) and described the position of the supplier as one which was 
characterised by a "(G]reat and special advantage ... "127 The Levis128 
approach widened Lord Hale's original doctrine; it was now not 
necessary to establish a monopoly, something less would suffice. 
In State Advances129 Myers CJ noted Levis130 as applying to water 
suppliers who had a practical monopoly .131 
Ostler J in Wairoa132 cited Levis133 and State Advances134 as being 
authority for the need to find a practical monopoly. The definition of 
124See text at above n 7 4 
125Above n 89 
126Above n 89, 512 
127Above n 89, 513 
128Above n 89 
129Above n 96 
130Above n 89 
131 Above n 96, 1715 
132Above n 99, 215 
133Above n 89 
134Above n 96 
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monopoly was not at issue in Hutt Golf Course, 135at issue was 
definition of supply in the Levis decision. In contrast the South 
Taranakt1 36 decision provides the only factual analysis of what might 
constitute a practical monopoly. Hutchison J believed that the State 
Advances137practical monopoly was synonymous with a position of 
great and special advantage.138 He noted that the South Taranaki 
Electric Power Board's empowering regulations did not give the board 
an exclusive right to supply electricity in the Patea Borough and that, 
accordingly it did not have a monopoly . In deciding that the board 
enjoyed a practical monopoly the Court considered the: 139 
(a) Impracticability of the Borough embarking on capital expenditure 
on a generating plant of its own, 
(b) Refusal of the Crown to directly supply the Borough, and 
(c) The unwillingness and unlikelihood of a neighbouring board to 
supply the Borough. 
The recent cases have not defined practical monopoly, although the 
Electricity Corporation in Auckland Electric14-0 conceded that they were 
bound to supply electricity at a fair and reasonable price . This may be 
a concession that it had, at the very least, a practical monopoly. With 
perhaps the exception of South Taranakt1 41 the cases have had largely 
simple factual situations, the issue of whether or not a monopoly exists 
135Above n 101 
136Above n 100 
137 Above n 96 
138Above n 96, 962 
139Above n 96, 962-964 
14-0Above n 105 
141Above n 100 
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was easily resolved by reference to legislation or by acknowledging that 
the particular industry (water and/or electricity) did not, by its nature, 
promote and create an abundance of suppliers. 
3 A fair and reasonable payment 
The payment of a fair and reasonable fee has remained constant 
throughout the development of the prime necessity doctrine. The 
moderate nature of the reimbursement is indicative of the original belief 
that the advantages of monopolistic private rights should be balanced 
by the public's interest. The Courts have not been troubled by a 
definition of a fair and reasonable price (as it rarely was an issue). In 
Allnutt142 it was conceded that the amount offered by Allnutt to the 
London Dock Company was reasonable ; what remained was whether 
or not the London Dock Company was obligated to accept the 
reasonable sum as rental. In Levis143 the Privy Council noted that the 
Court at first instance had decided that $300.00 was a fair amount for 
the supply of water. In Mayor of Auck/and'44 and Wairoa145 it was 
admitted that the envisaged charges were reasonable. In State 
Advances146 the Court of Appeal was asked specifically to set out the 
principles on which a fair and reasonable price could be fixed . Myers 
CJ stated, 11 [T]hat (without saying necessarily that it is the sole test) the 
charge made to other persons is at least a test and probably the best 
test of what is fair and reasonable."147 After noting the difficulty of 
142Above n 82 
143Above n 89 
144Above n 95 
145 Above n 99 
146 Above n 96 
147 Above n 96, 1718 
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fixing a reasonable price he said, ''there seems to be no reason why the 
Crown should pay more than the ordinary payer of rates is required to 
pay, plus the cost of connecting up with the system ."148 
In South Taranakt149 Hutchison J was asked to declare which of two 
alternatives were reasonable charges for the supply of electricity. It was 
also intimated by the Borough 's counsel that the Court would be asked 
to rule on elements of the proposed charges including replacement 
costs and of transmission charges .150 Because of the lack of hearing 
time it was agreed that the issue of reasonableness should be referred 
to the Registrar of the Court and an accountant as referees. 151 
The doctrine is old. This largely explains the relatively simple (when 
compared with section 36) concepts and purpose embodied in the 
doctrine. The doctrine grew up at a time when competition law had yet 
to evolve and consequently it is not imbued with any pro-competition 
purpose. It (being of a utilitarian nature) has been called to assist in a 
variety of circumstances, but essentially those involving contractual 
disputes. 
Before the doctrine and section 36 are compared, the impact of the 
Privy Council decision on section 36 will be discussed. 
V SECTION 36 AND TELECOMv CLEAR 
It has been argued that section 36 has been seriously weakened as a 
148Above n 96, 1724 
149Above n 100 
150Above n 100,956 
151Above n 100, 958 
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mechanism to control the abuse of a firm's dominant position in a 
market. The most recent criticism involves the Privy Council's 
interpretation of "use" in Telecom v Clear152 . The case involved a 
dispute about the cost that Clear was to pay Telecom for interconnection 
to the Public Service Telecommunications Network (PSTN) operated by 
Telecom. Interconnection was (and is) essential and has been 
described as being a "(S]ine qua non to competition ... "15.3 between 
Clear and Telecom. At the heart of the litigation was Telecom's pricing 
model which came to be known as the Baumol/Willig154 rule. The 
most controversial element of the rule states: 155 
Third, the competitive market standard requires that when one firm 
provides facilities or some other inputs to another firm, and this 
process entails some sacrifice of profit by the supplier firm (as when 
it thereby gives up some capacity that it would otherwise have used 
itse~). then the supplier firm must be permitted to price the article in 
question at a level sufficient to compensate it for the profit it is forced 
to sacrifice because of its supply to the other firm . Economists refer 
to the sacrifice of profit unavoidably entailed in an activity as the 
opportunity cost of that activity. 
In essence the rule allows Telecom (a company in a dominant position) 
to include in its price 156 for an intermediate product (interconnection 
152Above n 1 
15.3Above n 10, 218 
154After Telecom's expert American witnesses, economists, Professors Baumol and 
Willig . Dr Kahn (another American economist) was also called by Telecom 
155Above n 1, 405 
1S&rhe three principles on which a telecommunications company prices it product are: 
(i) Access (the cost of providing the network/infrastructure by which a caller 
makes a call, these costs exist whether or not a call is made) and usage (the 
additional costs incurred when someone makes a call) should be charged 
separately. • 
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to the PSTN) to Clear (a firm which wishes to compete with it) a 
component which represents the amount of profit it will lose: the private 
opportunity cost. The rationale behind the rule is simply that the rule 
reflects what would happen in a fully contestable or competitive market. 
A Use 
The Privy Council said that use of the Baumol/Willig rule could not 
amount to use of its dominant position because all Telecom was doing 
was what a firm in a competitive market would do. Van Roy has 
criticised this approach as being artificial because of its failure to 
recognise the use of the Baumol/Willig rule (the conduct) in the proper 
market context.157 Proper analysis of the nature of the conduct with 
reference to the market context would differentiate a refusal to supply 
goods by a firm in a dominant position from the same act by non-
dominant firm doing so because of the customer's poor history of 
payments. Although the purpose of the withholding supplies is highly 
relevant, the market context of a dominant incumbent and a fledgling 
new entrant will define whether or not refusal to supply amounts to a use 
(ii) The price must include the average incidental costs, that is the average cost 
of meeting the next increment of demand. The more usual requirement that 
a price covers the marginal cost (the cost of making the next unit of 
production) is not used because the next telecommunication unit can be very 
small (eg an extra telephone line or loop) or very large (eg a new exchange). 
(iii) The need to recover common costs i.e costs not incurred directly by the 
production of a particular unit, costs that remain even though the unit was no 
longer being made. 
See Terence Arnold , "The Courts, The Commerce Act and the Pricing of Access to 
Essential Facilities: Law & Economics at Work? A paper delivered to the LEANZ Group 
s December 1994 and W Pengilley "Determining Interconnection Prices in 
Telecommunications: New Zealand Lessons on the Role of a Regulator" (1993-1994) 
1 CCLJ 147, 153 
157 Above n 35, 59 
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of a dominant position.158 Van Roy notes159 that the Court of Appeal 
viewed Telecom's use of the pricing rule, which incorporated monopoly 
rents, as being one that could only be imposed on Clear because 
Telecom's dominant position. The Privy Council viewed the same 
conduct narrowly when it stated: 160 
[l]t cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position •uses• 
that position for the purposes of s 36 [unless] he acts in a way which 
a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same 
circumstances would have acted. 
Or, put another way, Telecom could not be using its dominance when 
it was relying on a rule that firms in a competitive market would rely on; 
as Ahdar says: 161 
With respect, this approach to causation seems extremely artificial and 
prone to mislead. There is an air of unreality in asking how a non-
dominant firm in a competitive market would have priced its essential 
facility . The very question strikes one as odd, as a sort of antitrust 
oxymoron. It is like asking how fast fish could run if they had legs. In 
a competitive market firms do not control essential facilities nor is their 
provision a sine qua non to effective competition flourishing at all. 
Likewise, how Telecom would have acted in another setting, a 
competitive market (one where its source of dominance, network 
control, would ex hypothesi not be present), is neither knowable nor 
is it the issue. 
158Above n 35, 58 
159Above n 35, 59 
160Above n 1, 403. The word •unless• appears to be a mistake. As van Roy notes, 
(above n 35, 56) the word "if" should be inserted in substitution for "unless•. See also 
Port Nelson 1995 (above n 15, 103790.)where McGechan J said, 'The 'unless' in the 
fourth to last line appears to be a reversal of an intended 'if' .... •. 
161 Rex J Ahdar 'Battles in New Zealand's Deregulated Telecommunications Industry•, 
(1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 77, 103 
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A further criticism of the Privy Council's approach to the treatment of use 
is that it is emphasised over the need to prove one of the purposes in 
section 36(1 )(a)(b) and (c). The Privy Council said: 162 
Although tt is legttimate to infer •purpose• from use of a dominant 
posrrion producing an anti-competrrive effect, tt may be dangerous to 
argue the converse ie that because the anti-competrrive purpose was 
present, therefore there was use of a dominant posttion. 
Van Roy considers this passage 163 to be indicative of the Privy 
Council's view that the test for use should be strict enough to determine 
which conduct will or will not be contrary to section 36. Such an 
approach ignores the requirement of proof of purpose in order to 
determine whether or not the use of the dominant position has 
contravened section 36 164 • The Privy Council acknowledged 165 that 
Telecom had an anti-competitive purpose but failed to view this in 
conjunction with Telecom's reliance on the Baumol/Willig pricing rule . 
The judgment was thus decided by defining use in the absence of 
purpose or market context. Van Roy concludes that the ambit of 
section 36 has been narrowed by the failure of the Privy Council to 
accept that conduct in one market situation might be benign while the 
162Above n 1, 402 
163See van Roy above n 35, 60. In support of her view the author also quoted the 
following passage from page 406 of the Privy Council decision: 
If a person has used his dominant position it is hard to imagine a case in which he 
would have done so otherwise than tor the purpose of the production of an anti-
competitive effect ; there will be no need to use the dominant position in the process of 
ordinary competition. Therefore, it will frequently be legitimate tor a Court to inter from 
the defendant 's use of his dominant position that his purpose was to produce the effect 
in tact produced. Therefore, as the Court of Appeal in the present case accepted, use 
and purpose, though separate requirements , will not be easily separated . 
164See ECNZ v Geotherm Energy Limited above n 26 and the Court of Appeal decision 
in Clear Communications Limited v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited above 
n 50 
165Above n 1, 403 
40 
same conduct in another market situation might amount to the use of a 
dominant position. The test, "[H]as the potential to be very narrow in 
scope, and to exclude from the ambit of section 36 a good deal of 
conduct which has in earlier cases been held to be contraventions of 
that section". 166 
Farmer's view is in contrast to that of van Roy. He argues that the Privy 
Council decision, "[A]ccepted the Court of Appeal's position that use 
and purpose, though separate requirements , will not be easily 
separated." 167 It is correct that the Privy Council cited Court of 
Appeal authority 168 for the proposition but it is difficult to accept that 
the Privy Council followed the authority. The fact that the Privy Council 
ignored Telecom's anti-competitive purpose had the inevitable result of 
separating it from the use element. 
In Port Nelson 1995 169 McGechan J utilised the Privy Council 's test for 
'use' in a way that will please the test's detractors. Port Nelson Limited 
was dominant in the market for tug services. It had refused the make 
its tugs available unless its pilots were used; the question was whether 
this refusal (the tug tie) amounted to "use" of a dominant position. 
McGechan J applied the Privy Council approach and asked himself 
wt1ether a firm, faced with competition, would have refused to make its 
tugs available unless its pilots were also engaged? In answering no to 
166Above n 35, 60 
167James Farmer "New Zealand Competition Law arrives in London• [1994] NZ Recent 
Law 365, 370. T Arnold is also of the view that the Privy Council adopted, ' [A]n 
orthodox formulation of the test to be applied under section 36 .. . ' Although he 
considered that the Privy Council 's approach to purpose suggests that ,• [W]here there 
is a use of dominance a general purpose to beat the new entrant ... . ' will suffice. See 
above n 156, 23 
168 ECNZ v Geotherm Energy Limited (above n 26) and Union Shipping NZ Limited v 
Port Nelson Limited, (above n 43) 
169Above n 15 
• 
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the question, (and finding that Port Nelson Limited had used its 
dominant position for an anti-competitive purpose) McGechan J 
said:"[O]ne must look at the commercial circumstances and steps taken 
at the time as pointing both to the course which a non-dominant firm 
would have taken in relation to a tie and onward to actual purpose ."170 
In contrast to the Privy Council's approach McGechan J was prepared 
to view the conduct taken in the context of the market at the time, in 
order to ascertain what a non-dominant firm would have done. This 
signals a broader more expansive approach to the test, one in which 
purpose and effect might feature. 17 1 
B The Role of Section 36 
In addition to the narrowing of the definition of use the Privy Council has 
also taken a restrictive view of the role and ambit of section 36. The 
proscribed purposes at section 36(1 )(a) and (b) of the Act have been 
misconstrued. The Privy Council said , "[l]n considering whether 
Telecom's monopoly profits (if any) will produce so high a price to Clear 
that Clear would be prevented from entering the market at all."172 In 
dealing with the evidence the Board: 173 
[N]oted that it has not been established by Clear (nor can it be 
regarded as a serious risk) that Telecom 's charges will be so high that 
Clear will be unable to enter the CBD market at all. Surprisingly, Clear 
did not produce any of its figures to the Court. As a result Clear could 
170Above n 15, 103, 824 
171Van Roy also noted the possibility of a Court taking a broad view of the conduct at 
issue and the market context , see above n 35, 60 
172Above n 1, 404. Emphasis added 
173Above n 1, 407. Emphasis added 
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not make any factual case that it would be altogether prevented by the 
level of Telecom 's charges from entering the market at all. 
It was not necessary for Clear to prove that its entry had been totally 
restricted, as Gault J said in the Court of Appeal, "s 36 is not confined 
to wholly preventing or denying competitive conduct as seems to have 
been assumed by Dr Kahn ... ".174 This is consistent with the wording 
of section 36(1 )(a) and (b) which requires the purpose of, "Restricting 
the entry ... ," or, "Preventing or deterring any person ... ". Contravention 
of section 36 will also occur when the proscribed purpose is present but 
that purpose has not been achieved. This is consistent with Gault J's 
view that the total prevention of competitive conduct need not be proved 
in order to show a breach of section 36. Ahdar is of the view that the 
Privy Council's "all or nothing" approach to section 36 makes, 11 [T]he 
Plaintiff's burden even more formidable than it already is."175 
Inherent in the Board 's judgment is a failure to appreciate section 36's 
pivotal role in promoting competition in those markets where an 
incumbent is in a dominant position. It is this paper's view that 
McGechan J correctly identified the role of section 36 and the 
Commerce Act 1986 when he said : 176 
A firm may have a dominant position in a market. That is not unlawful. 
The firm, in that dominant position, may trade in competitive fashion. 
That is now unlawful. Indeed, the purpose of the Commerce Act is to 
encourage competition , including vigorous competition on the part of 
all firms, including dominant firms . It is only when the dominant firm 
oversteps that mark , and •uses" its dominant position for anti-
competitive purposes (specified ins 36(1 )(a)(b)(c)) , that the law steps 
174Above n 50, 103358 
175Above n 161, 104 
176See Port Nelson 1995 above n 15 103, 789 
f' 
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in. 
The concern the Board had for Telecom is indicative of the Privy 
Council's predilection for viewing section 36 in terms that were benign , 
to a monopolist. Although the Board was correct when it said that a 
monopolist is entitled to compete with other competitors, 177 it failed to 
note the pro-competition role of section 36 when it said that if a 
monopolist was not allowed to compete, to do so, 11 [W]ould be holding 
an umbrella over inefficient competitors. 11 178 As Ahdar states: 179 
The plain fact is that in a natural monopoly situation the monopolist 
must hold the umbrella out at least enough to enable competition to 
spring into life but - and this is the crux - thereafter no further. 
In the context of a natural monopoly, Ahdar's view reflects the very 
purpose of section 36. 
The dismissal of Justice Gault 's 11has the defendant acted reasonably or 
justifiably11180 test (in determining use of a dominant position) because 
of its uncertainty led the Board to conclude that, 11 [S] 36 must be 
construed in such a way as to enable the monopolist, before he enters 
upon a line of conduct, to know with some certainty whether or not it is 
lawful.11181 The Privy Council highlighted the 11quasi-criminal111 82 
177 Above n 1 , 402 
178Above n 1, 402 
179Above n 161 , 104 
180Above n 50, 103,354 
181Above n 1, 403 
182Above n 1, 403. See also Valentine Korah "Charges for Inter-Connection to a 
Telecommunications Network" (1994-1995)2 CCLJ , 213 at 227. Korah, in an effusive 
article about the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear, notes that the prospect of 
a Court , after the event, finding that a firm's prices were excessive (and because of 
• 
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penalties as justification for its view. It also explains the subsequent 
single test for use formulation. The Privy Council's quest for certainty 
has, by the imposition of a single test to activities that change with 
circumstance and time, hampered the role of section 36. 
It is also exaggerated to suggest that a firm's liability under section 36 
turns exclusively on a definition of use (although this was the practical 
effect in Telecom v Clear). Proof of a dominant position, a market and 
the proscribed purpose are also required. Indeed if Gault J's, "acted 
reasonably" test 183 is failed it does not necessarily follow that the firm 
has the proscribed purpose. This would be particularly so where the 
dominant firm thought it's conduct was reasonable at the time. Section 
80(2)(a) and (c) also allow a Court to take into account the nature, 
extent and circumstances of the conduct. This affords a firm an 
opportunity to highlight its properly held belief that it acted justifiably and 
reasonably when it carried out the impugned conduct. 
The importance of section 36 to competition in the telecommunications 
industry (given the New Zealand Government's adherence to a light-
handed regulation of the industry) was overlooked by the Board. The 
Court of Appeal acknowledged this fact184 and viewed the Part IV of 
the Commerce Act 1986 machinery (which empowered the Government 
to regulate to prevent monopoly prices) as being redundant. In the light 
of this reality it is understandable why the Court of Appeal considered 
the monopoly element within the Baumol/Willig pricing rule as 
contributing to a price that had the effect of substantially reducing 
that, amounted to an unreasonable act) and awarding penalties would be unfair and 
inefficient. 
183Gault J only envisaged using this test when the firm was dominant in a market, 
because of its control of a facility to which access was essential if a competitor was to 
enter a downstream market, see above n 50, 103, 354 
184Above n 50, 103 359 • 
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competition. While acknowledging the potential for monopoly rents 
within Telecom's price the Board did not accept that the Baumol/Willig 
rule would prevent competition, as it provided, "[A] proper model for 
demonstrating what would be charged by the hypothetical supplier in a 
perfectly contestable market. 11185 The risk of profits was unproven and 
if they were present they could either be competed out or regulated 
against by the use of the Part IV machinery. The fact that the New 
Zealand Government's policy was not to use Part IV was of, 11 [N]o 
concern of the Courts.11186 The Board viewed the Court of Appeal's 
emphasis on the monopoly component of the Baumol/Willig rule, and its 
subsequent rejection of the rule as amounting to a quasi-regulatory 
activity, something (and on this point the Board agreed with the Court 
of Appeal) that was not the preserve of the Courts. 
Given the narrowing of the definition of use and the Privy Council's 
restrictive construction of section 36 are there alternative means of 
ensuring access to a natural monopoly? 
VI ALTERNATIVES TO SECTION 36 
Van Roy 187 suggests amending section 36 in order that the role of 
'use' is set out, and the ways in which it will be determined are clearly, 
but not exhaustively, listed. 
Van Roy envisages a clear statutory statement that 'use' is to be 
determined as the causal link between the conduct complained of and 
185Above n 1, 407 
186Above n 1, 408 
187 Above n 35, 60 
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the dominant position 188 , and that it is, "[T]he purpose of the conduct 
that determines which uses contravene the Act" . 189 Van Roy states 
that the following should be noted as the way in which "use" might be 
determined: 190 
(i) Conduct which would only be done by a firm with market power, or 
which would not be done by a firm in a competitive market situation; 
and 
(ii) Conduct which only has an anti-competitive effect when carried out by 
a firm with market power; and 
(iii) Any other method that the Court thinks best describes the causal 
connection between use and dominance in the particular case , taking 
into account the market context of the conduct. 
Further reform that contemplates the continued use of the Commerce 
Act 1986 has been mooted by a paper prepared by the Ministry of 
Commerce and The Treasury. 191 The paper acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear 
192 and the failure of both companies to resolve the interconnection 
dispute after four years of litigation. The paper proposes that there are 
four institutions capable of resolving an access price dispute such as 
that in Telecom v Clear, 193 they are 194 : direct Governmental 
intervention, an industry specific regulatory agency, mandatory 
188Above n 35, 60 
191 "Regulation of Access to Vertically Integrated Natural Monopolies a Discussion 
Paper" Ministry of Commerce and The Treasury (Wellington, New Zealand , August 
1995) 
192Above n 1 
193Above n 1 
194Above n 191, 89 - 97 
195Above n 191, 89 - 97 
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arbitration and the existing Courts. The paper doesn't contemplate the 
use of any common law doctrines, it envisages any dispute being 
resolved 195 with reference to the Commerce Act 1986 (in its present 
form), the Act plus general legislative regulatory principles and the Act 
plus industry specific access pricing principles. The proposals put 
forward await public submissions and further Governmental action. The 
suggestions for reform have been born of the same criticisms that have 
regenerated an interest in the doctrine. A comparison of section 36 and 
the doctrine is necessary. 
VII SECTION 36 AND THE PRIME NECESSITY DOCTRINE - A 
COMPARISON 
A Purpose 
The pro-competitive thrust of section 36 needs no further discussion . As 
drafted section 36 is a sophisticated tool that defines when otherwise 
normal competitive behaviour becomes anti-competitive. It's creation 
was largely as a consequence of there being either no specific statutory 
control of monopolistic activities or ineffective amendments to earlier 
trade practices legislation 196 . In contrast, the doctrine is a utilitarian 
vehicle for ensuring access to (and payment for) a prime necessity. 
The purpose of the doctrine is founded in the notion that the Courts 
have the power to exert, 11 [C]ontrols in the public interest over activities 
195Above n 191, 89 - 97 
196See the Commerce Amendment Act 1976 and a further amendment in 1983. The 
Trade Practices Act 1958 stated that any complete or partial monopoly of supply of 
goods was an examinable trade practice • 
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that might loosely be described as utility services."197 One 
commentator198 has analysed the doctrine in terms of the "[B]asic 
social obligations"199 of a monopoly public service supplier of an 
essential commodity. More particularly he said the doctrine sets out a 
reciprocal public obligation (to supply, at a fair and reasonable price) on 
public utilities whose character is derived from there use of public 
facilities (eg telephone poles, cables and pipes under streets). 
Ahda,-200 suggests that the renewed interest in the prime necessity 
doctrine is because people believe that the deregulation, corporatisation 
and privatisation of 1980's and 1990's has resulted in a lack of 
accountability. The doctrine and its use as a means of controlling state 
owned enterprises is discussed by M Taggart201 in an article about 
the interaction between public law and state owned enterprises. Given 
the comments of Galbraith, Ahdar and the doctrine 's origins (that is, the 
belief that certain private property rights are subject to the rights of the 
public) it is hard not to associate the doctrine with public law rather than 
competition law. However, to do so would be to ignore the fact that the 
doctrine has been confined to contractual and statutory disputes 
between a supplier and a purchaser. It has been a convenient means 
of imposing a solution in the absence of any other common law or 
statutory remedy. 
197 A Galbraith QC. "Deregulation, Privatisation and Corporatisation of Crown Activity : 
How will the Law Respond?' , a paper presented at the New Zealand Law Conference, 
Wellington 2-5 March 1993, reproduced in Conference Papers Volume 1 p226-240, 236 
198Above n 197, 237, A Galbraith QC cites the Wairoa & South Taranakidec'sions (see 
text at n 99 and 100) and calls what has been referred to as the prime necessity 
doctrine, the •essential services doctrine• 
199Above n 197, 231 
200Above n 161 , 112 
201 M Taggart ·state Owned Enterprises and Social Responsibility , A Contradiction in 
Terms?' [1993] NZ Recent Law 343, 362 
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8 Dominance 
The doctrine's 'equivalent' to section 36's dominance is the notion that 
a firm enjoys a position of great and special advantage. This was later 
defined202 in terms of a firm having a practical monopoly in the supply 
of the particular services or goods. It is not sufficient that a firm 's 
business is that which can be described as a prime necessity, the firm 
must have a practical monopoly in that business . The fact that most of 
the cases have dealt with the water and electricity supply industries203 
has meant that there has been no in-depth analysis of what a practical 
monopoly is. However, South Taranakf-04 approached the concept 
with market related matters in mind such as the whether or not the 
Borough could find an alternative supply and the fact that potential 
alternative suppliers were not prepared to supply . 
Overall, economic analysis was something that did not trouble the 
Courts in the early decisions. Such a state of affairs rests easily with the 
non-economic approach to dominance adopted by the Court of Appeal 
in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Commerce 
Commission.205 The Court of Appeal acknowledged that in the course 
of investigating whether or not dominance existed the application of 
section 3(8) of the Commerce Act 1986 was to be on a case by case 
basis and that the structural and behavioural factors of the particular 
market should be looked at pragmatically. Although the early decisions 
on the doctrine were never expressed in terms of market considerations 
they did involve practical and uncomplicated decisions on the existence 
202See text at n 131 
203See Levis (text at n 89) State Advances (text at n 96) Wairoa Electric (text at n 99) 
and South Taranaki (text at n 100) 
204See text at n 100 
205See text at above n 31 
r 
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of a practical monopoly. The concept (of practical monopoly) was never 
given a meaning, it was more a description that the Courts attached to 
the facts before them. 
Despite the similarity of the case by case nature enquiries into 
dominance/practical monopoly, it is submitted that the doctrine's 
practical monopoly threshold will be more easily reached than the 
section 36 dominance threshold. 
The view that the doctrine's practical monopoly threshold is more easily 
reached than section 36 dominance threshold may well be of little 
practical significance. The existence of a prime necessity almost 
certainly predicates the existence of a practical monopoly or section 36 
dominance. A prime n~cessity has been defined broadly as applying to 
the collection of rubbish206 , the supply of watef07 , the supply of 
electricity208 , the provision of warehouse space209 and access to 
maritime port services210 • In none of the above was there any 
challenge to the fact that the non-supplier was not, in fact, in a practical 
monopoly situation. The non-suppliers were invariably municipal and 
maritime authorities or organisations that had statutory power that 
enabled them to supply warehouse space or electricity exclusively. 
Those prime necessities that involved water, electricity and access to a 
port all had high sunk costs which gravitated strongly against there 
206Mayor of Auckland see text at n 95 
'20? Levis and State Advances see text at n 89 and n 96 
208 Wairoa Electric, South Taranaki & Auckland Electric Power Board see text at n 99, 
n 100 and n 105 
209Allnutt, see text at n 82 
210oe Portibus Maris and New Zealand Rail Limited v Port Marlborough New Zealand 
Limited see text n 7 4 and n J 14 
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being any rival supplier. In Telecom v Cleat211 it was conceded that 
Telecom was in a dominant position in the fixed local telephone market 
because of its control of the PSTN. In terms of the prime necessity 
doctrine there is no reason why the public service telecommunications 
network would not be viewed as a prime necessity: Access to the 
network by Clear would certainly be required by Barker J's formulation 
of the doctrine, viz, "[A] monopoly supplier of an essential commodity 
has a duty to supply ... 11212 • 
C Fair and Reasonable Price 
Monopoly profits per se are not contrary to section 36 . This was noted 
by the Privy Council in Telecom when it said:213 
The Court of Appeal took the view that s 36 had the wider purpose, 
beyond producing fair compet~ion, of eliminating monopoly proftts 
currently obtained by the person in the dominant market pos~ion. 
Their Lordships do not agree. 
However, monopoly profits may be a reason why there has been 
contravention of section 36. In the Court of Appeal Gault J noted214 
Telecom's insistence on an access code, its intention to charge its 
subscribers an additional amount (based on Clear's own charge for 
terminating calls in its own network) and its refusal to give interim 
connection to enable Clear to meet its Justice Department obligations, 
(in addition to the monopoly profits) all amounted to the use of a 
211Above n 1 
212Auck/and Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited 
above n 105 
213Above n 1, 407 
214Above n 50, 103, 360 
r 
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dominant position. 
The issue of price lies at the heart of the doctrine. It does, however, 
remain largely undefined.215 Land216 says the State Advances217 fair and 
reasonable price test (being the price chargeable to other persons) is 
problematic. He notes that it would be unlikely for a Court to accept 
that a monopolist's prices are fair and reasonable because they are the 
same as charged to other persons. Recent cases provide some 
guidance on how a Court may define fair and reasonable. 
In Union Shipping NZ Limited v Port Nelson Limitecf16 the Court was 
asked to decided whether Port Nelson's charges were (pursuant to 
section 49 of the Waterfront Industry Commission Act 1976) 
commercially reasonable. The Court defined a commercially reasonable 
price as being one that allowed the recovery of daily running costs, a 
contribution towards capital costs and a reasonable margin for 
profit.219 In Air New Zealand Limited v Wellington International Airport 
Limitec!2° Air New Zealand brought a judicial review claim challenging 
the Airport Company's setting of landing fees. The Court held that the 
Airport Company was entitled to recover the costs of providing the 
service along with a reasonable commercial return. In New Zealand Rail 
Limited v Port Marlborough New Zealand Limitecf21 the Court of 
Appeal considered what documents were relevant to the issue of what 
215See text above n 142 - n 145 
216Above n 80, 11 
217 See text above n 146 - 148 
218Above n 43 
219Above n 43,694 
220Unreported, 15 October 1993, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 829/92 
221Above n 114 
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was a reasonable fee. Richardson J noted that New Zealand Rail 
Limited's own profitability was not relevant. He went on to say, 11 [T]he 
inquiry necessary focuses on the assets employed and the costs 
incurred by an efficient provider of terminal services in a notionally 
competitive market.11222 
The use of the words "fair and reasonable" reveal the doctrine's common 
law, as opposed to economic, background. The common law approach 
of the Court of Appeal in Clear v Telecom and its rejection of the 
economic Baumol/Willig rule is certainly more aligned to the doctrine 
than an economic approach to the provisions of the Commerce Act 
1986. Having spurned the Baumol/Willig rule Gault J said, "[l]t may be 
helpful in determining whether there has been use of the dominant 
position merely to consider whether the firm has acted reasonably or 
with justification."223 Cooke P said, "[T]hat Telecom is entitled to a fair 
commercial return ... 11224 for Clear's use of the PSTN and the charge is 
to be, 11 [F]ixed on the basis of what a network owner not in competition 
for the custom of subscribers could reasonably charge for use of its 
facilities.225 The re-emergence of these common law concepts was to 
be shortlived. The Privy Council said226 that Gault J's belief that use 
might be determined by the reasonableness of the firm's actions was 
too uncertain a test for a monopolist firm to be able to understand and 
apply to its affairs. Nonetheless, Land227 considers that in 
ascertaining a fair and reasonable price the Court would have regard to 
222Above n 114, 644 
223Above n 50, 103, 354 
224Above n 50, 103, 344 
225Above n 50, 103,344 
226Above n 1, 403 
227 Above n 80, 13 
r 
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the value of the assets, the appropriate rate of return and the efficiency 
of operation. 
D The Role of the Court 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the doctrine and section 
36 is the role of the Court in determining what a fair and reasonable 
price is. The cases since Levis22-8 have not been troubled by the 
concept as the price has generally been agreed upon or been easily 
referable to external factors or an external agency. The possibility of the 
Court being involved in an economic analysis of what constituted a fair 
and reasonable price was never contemplated until State Advances229 
and South TaranakPJ. In the context of Commerce Act litigation the 
Courts231 , at all levels, have made it clear that they have no desire to be 
involved in fixing a price. 
If the doctrine is to be workable the Courts must be prepared to fix a 
price. The Courts' views to date have been discouraging. 
E Can the Court Regulate? 
Rule has cited four reasons why Courts are not able to properly regulate 
228 Above n 89 
229See text at n 96 
230See text at n 1 00 
231 See the comments of Cooke P in Clear v Telecom at text n 221 and n 222. The 
Privy Council in Telecom v Clear (above n 1, 408) said (after noting the difficult 
considerations inherent in the concept of a reasonable price} , "They are the daily diet 
of a regulatory body,• and Blanchard J in New Zealand Private Hospitals Association -
Auckland Branch (ING) above n 121) "Happily, no one wants the Court to get into the 
business of price fixing• • 
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prices. They are: 232 
(a) Courts are deprived of an industry wide view when they are 
called upon to determine a specific matter between injured 
parties. 
(b) Courts lack the specialised economic/accounting skills to 
determine a particular price. 
(c) Courts are not structured in a manner that allows for ongoing 
monitoring and reappraisal of a particular price. 
(d) The process of fixing a price is a political task, which a Court 
should have nothing to do with. 
The first three reasons have also been noted by Pengilley,233 in the 
context of the High Court decision in Clear v Telecom, who doubted 
whether a Court had the accounting and auditing expertise to secure the 
raw data from Clear and Telecom to enable it to calculate marginal, 
average incremental, common and opportunity costs and any return on 
assets necessary for the implementation of the Baumol/Willig rule.234 
The political nature of judicial decision making is hardly a new 
phenomenon for the Courts and it has not, to date, prevented a Court 
232C Rule 'Antitrust and Bottleneck Monopolies: Toe Lessons of the AT & T Decree" 
Remarks before the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, October 1988, cited in JGM 
Shirtcliffe "Access to Essential Facilities in Electricity Supply' in M Copeland and W 
Haddrell (eds) Competition Review: Current Issues in New Zealand Competition and 
Consumer LawVol 5 May 1993 (Wellington Commerce Commission 1993) 2, 42. See 
also the Discussion Paper (above n, 190) for a comparison of the Courts, Arbitrators , 
regulatory bodies and Governmental intervention as regulatory institutions. 
~ Pengilley "Determining Interconnection Prices in Telecommunications: New 
Zealand Lessons on the Role of a Regulator" (1993-1994) 1 CCLJ 147, 158 
234Rule 324 of the High Court Rules enables the Court to appoint an expert witness to 
enquire into a question of fact. Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act 1908 allow 
for the referral of the dispute to a special referee or arbitrator 
• 
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from making a decision. Proponents235 of judicial regulation have 
drawn on the role the American Courts have had in defining what a 
11reasonable 11 fee is in the essential facilities doctrine 236 . Shirtcliffe237 
has noted that the American Courts have expressed a reluctance to 
regulate and where they have, they have either done so in broad terms 
and then referred the detail to a regulatory body238 or made a decision 
on the price with detailed reference to earlier negotiations between the 
parties239 or the price paid for the facility by a party who is not in 
competition with the supplier in a downstream market.240 
In Queensland Wire Industries Ltd v The BHP Co Ltcf41 the High Court 
of Australia held that there had been a misuse of market power by 
Queensland Wire when it offered to supply Y bar to BHP at prices that 
were "excessively high",242 and were not "competitive".243 The High 
235See Galbraith above n 197, 238 
236For examples see below n 238, 239 and 240 
237 Above n 8, 44-46 
238See Consolidated Gas Co of Florida v City Gas Co of Florida 665 F Supp 1493 and 
Otter Tail Power Co v United States 410 US 366 (1973) where the Court ordered City 
Gas to sell at a •reasonable price' and that Otter Tail should not be forced to supply 
electricity at rates that were not compensatory. In both cases the exact details of the 
price were referred to the regulatory agency in Florida and the Federal Power 
Commission 
239See Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Co 472 US 585 (1985) and Byars 
v Bluff City News 609 F .2d 843 (1979) where no regulatory body was in existence but 
there was a history of earlier dealings between the parties 
240See US v Terminal Railroad Association 224 US 383 (1912) and Associated Press 
v US 326 US 1 (1945) where a facility (a railway bridge and a wire service) was held 
collectively by a group which sought to exclude a new entrant. The terms on which 
the facility was held by the existing group members could be used to ascertain a 
reasonable price to be charged to the new entrant 
241 (1988)ATPR 40,841 (Federal Court) 
242(1989) 83 ALA 577, 594 
243Above n 242,577,604 
" 
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Court remitted the case back to the trial judge for the fixing of the terms 
of the injunction which would have involved the fixing of a reasonable 
price .244 In Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd v ASX Operations Pty Ltcl45 
the Federal Court of Australia found that ASX had misused its market 
power in insisting on a price and terms (for the supply of electronic 
stock exchange information) that could only be insisted on because of 
it's monopolistic position. The Court ordered that supply be granted on 
"commercially reasonable11246 terms, additionally Wilcox J made a 
specific order that the supply be fixed at a "cost plus" supply price .247 
On appeal the full Federal Court rejected the "cost plus" pricing but did 
not reject the idea of judicial price fixing, when a monopoly price might 
amount to a firm taking advantage of its power for an anti-competitive 
purpose.248 
The outcome of the Pont Data full Federal Court decision is an example 
of the potential for vagueness and uncertainty in judicial price fixing 
which would make it particularly difficult for any firm to forecast what a 
reasonable price is. Although the United States and the Australian 
cases show a willingness (albeit reluctant) to regulate, the background 
of the United States cases is different to the prime necessity cases and 
Telecom v Clear. The principle difference is that in New Zealand there 
is a lack of prior dealing between or with natural monopolies and there 
are no telecommunications or electricity industry regulatory bodies which 
a Court might refer to for the detail of a pricing order. In the United 
States there has been a long history of private ownership of those 
2~e parties settled; the trial judge (Pincus J) was never asked to fix the price 
245(1990)ATPR 41,007 
246Above n 245, 41 132 
247 Above n 245, 41 068 
248 ASX Operations Pty Ltd v.Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41109 
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industries (railways, electricity generation and supply and 
telecommunications) which have been owned by the State in New 
Zealand. This different economic history accounts, to a large degree, for 
the United States judicial pricing case law. 
In the context of section 36, it is submitted that there is always going to 
be an element of price regulation by the Courts . In Clear v 
Teleconi~he Court of Appeal effectively regulated against a rule that 
had allowed the incumbent to potentially recover monopoly rents from 
the new entrant. Although the Court noted that it had no interest in 
fixing prices it did re-introduce the concept of a fair and reasonable fee . 
The Privy Council250 said the Court was not a regulatory body yet 
implemented the Baumol/Willig rule which was a quasi-regulatory 
act.251 The Baumol/Willig rule is regulatory in its nature, in so far as it 
calls for an assessment of Telecom's: 
(a) marginal costs 
(b) average incremental costs 
(c) common costs 
(d) - opportunity costs 
The calculation of the above would be complex and require full 
disclosure by the market incumbent, who would probably be less than 
eager to reveal its inner most financial secrets _ The Privy Council, 
despite eschewing the role of judicial regulation, has by the adoption of 
an economic model given itself the role. The Court has now left open 
the possibility of litigants arguing about whether or not the calculations 
249 Above n 50 
250 Above n 1 , 408 
251Above n 233, 157 and 158 • 
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required by the rule are correct. As the High Court in Clear v Telecom 
noted:252 
[T]here would be a need for careful design of the administrative 
system. Regular reviews would be necessary to adjust for shifting 
prices and costs. It would be important to design an arm's length 
mechanism that would minimise the possibility of collusion. There is 
another point in which some regulatory presence may be needed. It 
would be important for the reviews not to take place at too frequent 
intervals, for that would reveal sensitive market information; the 
adjustments should be backdated, with interest covering the time value 
of money. 
The "[R]egulatory presence [that] may be needed ... ", be it in the form of 
Part N intervention, or in an industry specific regulatory body is not in 
existence. With a Government that has shown no signs of using its Part 
N powers (to eliminate monopoly rents) or re-regulating at least a part 
of the telecommunications industry the only available forum (of last 
resort) is the Court. Although there are difficulties with the judicial fixing 
of price they are not insurmountable. In the absence of any other entity 
the Courts must accept the responsibility. 
The discussion in this part has emphasised the sophisticated nature of 
section 36 and the "unsophisticated", general and utilitarian nature of the 
doctrine. Both section 36 and the doctrine are capable of being applied 
to the same set of facts, in the situation of a natural monopoly, is the 
outcome likely to be different? 
VIII A TEST - SECTION 36 AND THE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THE 
FACTS OF TELECOM v CLEAR 
252Above n 49, 170 • 
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A Facts 
It will be recalled that Telecom was dominant in the local fixed telephone 
call market. Telecom owned and operated the PSTN; 253 
interconnection to which was essential if Clear was to compete in the 
local fixed telephone call market. Telecom wished to charge Clear an 
interconnection price that allowed them to recoup monopoly profits. 
B Elements of Section 36 and the Doctrine 
Section 36 requires proof of a market, dominance (within that market) 
and use of the dominance for one of the proscribed (anti-competitive) 
purposes at section 36(1) (a), (b) and (c). 
The doctrine requires proof of a prime necessity, the supplier (of the 
prime necessity) holding a practical monopoly and a fair and reasonable 
payment. 
1 Market 
The definition the market was not in issue in Telecom v Clear.254 The 
relevant market (fixed local telephone call business) was easily identified 
and thus proved . The doctrine does not have an equivalent. 
2 Prime necessity 
Proof of a particular kind of business is not required by section 36. The 
doctrine requires a prime necessity or an essential commodity .255 As 
253See text at n 152 
254Above n 1 
255See text above n 105 
• 
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already mentioned a prime necessity has been defined broadly; the 
electricity and water supply industries have been identified in New 
Zealand as being a prime necessity. The earlier survey of the cases 
revealed that the prime necessities were often in the form of a natural 
monopoly. It is this paper's view that Telecom's ownership of the PSTN 
would be defined as a prime necessity. 
3 Dominance and practical monopoly 
The fact of Telecom's dominance in the market was conceded. Given 
this paper's view that the practical monopoly threshold is lower than the 
existing section 36 dominance threshold, it is submitted that the doctrine 
would consider Telecom to be in the position if a practical monopolist in 
the operation of the PSTN and in the provision of local fixed telephone 
call services. 
4 Use and purpose 
Proof of both is required. Although Telecom had an anti-competitive 
purpose the Privy Council considered that it had not used its position 
because it did nothing that a firm in a competitive market would not have 
done. The doctrine does not require proof of purpose or use. 
5 A fair and reasonable charge 
Given the doctrine's common law origins and the sense of fairness, 
equity and even-handedness inherent in the expression, ''fair and 
reasonable 11 it is particularly difficult to envisage the doctrine allowing 
Telecom to insist on an interconnection price that contained or allowed 
monopoly profits. 
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If the doctrine is applied to Telecom v Clea/256 it is submitted that 
Telecom would have been required to interconnect Clear to the PSTN 
for a reasonable price. The Baumol/Willig rule would not have been 
sanctioned as a means of calculating the price. In many ways this 
outcome is similar to that in the Court of Appeal 257 . Importantly, 
Clear's job would have been made easier by the need to prove the 
fewer, and conceptually simpler, components of the doctrine. 
V CONCLUSION 
The Privy Council's restrictive treatment of section 36 in Telecom v Clear 258 
is evidenced by a test for use that disregards the market context in 
which the impugned conduct took place, and the need to prove the 
purposive element. The effect of such a test is to ignore the fact that 
otherwise normal competitive behaviour in a fully contestable market 
could amount to anti-competitive behaviour in a monopolistic market; put 
simply the test failed to compare 'like with like'. Additionally, the Privy 
Council failed to note the pivotal pro-competition role of section 36 in 
ensuring access to vertically integrated natural monopolies. The lack of 
any industry specific regulatory body to control the telecommunications 
industry and the unwillingness of the New Zealand Government to use 
the Part IV machinery was of no concern to the Board. 
The disabling effect of the decision has prompted trenchant criticism, a 
call for the amendment of the section, a Ministry of Commerce/Treasury 
discussion paper (seeking submissions on the future of section 36 and 
its role in the regulation of access to natural monopolies) and further 
256Above n 1 
257 Above n 50 
258Above n 1 r 
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interest in the doctrine. 
The paper's survey of section 36 and the doctrine reveals a 
sophisticated statutory instrument and unsophisticated utilitarian 
doctrine. Section 36 is part of a wider statutory scheme designed to 
promote competition while the doctrine has no specific competition law 
focus, it has, at its heart, public law concepts of mutual social obligations 
and fairness. The doctrine provides a workable alternative to section 36 
as its pragmatism and common law origins have led to it being framed 
in terms that are easier to prove than the elements of section 36. 
The Baumol/Willig rule has the potential to restrict the entry of new 
entrants if the monopoly rent component of the price rule is sufficiently 
high. The High Court and Privy Council acknowledged, that if the 
monopoly profits did constitute a barrier to entry, the Part IV machinery 
existed to remove such a barrier. The rule must work with Governmental 
regulation, which is unlikely to occur. There exists the real possibility 
that a dominant firm in a market can now, with immunity, charge a price 
that it could not in a competitive market before it allows access to a 
product or service to a potential competitor. The prospect of 
Governmental intervention is so remote as to constitute little in the way 
of a deterrent to firms that can prevent entry by the imposition of a price 
that contains monopoly rents. 
The doctrine is a workable alternative to section 36 if the Courts are 
prepared to regulate a fair and reasonable price. In the absence of a 
regulatory body or direct Governmental intervention the Courts remain 
the only forum for resolving access difficulties. Although there are 
problems with the judicial fixing of a reasonable price they are not 
insurmountable. In the absence of any other entity the Courts must 
accept the responsibility. 
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